Abstract
More and more companies rely on option to solve the contradiction of the agency by agreement. Meanwhile, CSRC and SASAC issued relevant regulations in 2006. After referring to some experts’ research materials, this thesis brings up the posibility of stock option incentive to make the accounting behaviors be alienation. There are some reasons that makes the possibility easy to become true, such as over-rely on the stock option, serious insider control, low target and the lack of effective supervising.
Therefore, the thesis draws a conclution that management incentive does make the managers have the motive to fabricate theiir accounting behaviors. But the drawbacks of the managerial systems determines most. An ideal incentive system should not only correct the motive of managers but standardize their behaviors and strenthen the supervising as well. With it, a company’s accounting information can be reflected correctly.
Key words: management incentive, stock option incentive, alienation of accounting behaviors, insider control