乐观地看北京:为什么民主制度无法征服中国

论文格式

乐观地看北京:为什么民主制度无法征服中国




      BEiiing Through Rassesemocracy Cannot Tame China　By Harry Harding
　　There is an increasing drumbeat for pushing a democraticproject in China to *fend off its inevitable aggressiveauthoritarian ambitions. There is little doubt that China willwish to become a preeminent4 power in its own hemisphere.But the argument that creating a pluralistic, democraticsystem in China will sideline7 a coming clash betweenWashington and BEIjing is overly optimistic. Certainly it istrue that China and the United States will be competitors,even rivals, not only because one is an established powerand the other a rising power, but also because their politicalsystems embody very different ideologies. American conceptsof democracy pose an existential threat to the Communistregime; Successful Chinese growth under an authoritariansystem is a threat to American leadership and exceptionalism.
　　Recently, *Aaron Friedberg8 masterfully combined, in away that is quite unusual, realist and non-realist componentsin an argument whose crescend is that "it is likely thata more democratic China would ultimately create a morepeaceful, less war-prone environment in Asia." It would also,of course, simultaneously remove the threat to the American
　　目前在推动中国的民主事业，以抵御该国不可避免的气势逼人的强烈专制欲上，鼓噪之声渐强。中国想要在其所处的半球成为一个有影响力的杰出大国，这一点几乎没有什么疑问。然而，认为在中国创造一个多元化的民主体制将避免华盛顿和北京所面临的冲突，这种看法太过乐观。毫无疑问，中国和美国将是竞争对手，乃至敌手。这不仅是因为一个是公认的大国，另一个是崛起中的大国，还因为两国的政治体制包含着截然不同的意识形态。美国的民主理念对中共政权构成了现存的威胁；中国经济在专制体制下的成功发展对美国的领导地位和例外论也构成威胁。
　　最近，阿伦·弗里德伯格以一种相当不同寻常的方式在一个观点中巧妙融合了现实主义和非现实主义因素，其主旨是说，“一个更加民主的中国最终很可能会在亚洲创造出一个更加和平、不那么容易爆发战争的环境”。当然，这样一来，对美国sense of ideological supremacy. Thus "in the long run, theUnited States can learn to live with a democratic China asthe dominant power in East Asia, much as Great Britaincame to accept America as the preponderant power in theWestern Hemisphere." But, "until that day, Washingtonand Beijing are going to remain locked in an increasinglyintense struggle for mastery in Asia."
　　This is an argument that has been made before.It's one of the rosy forecasts that Jim Mann has called a"soothing scenario." And it is fraught with uncertainty.It is, in fact, highly unlikely that China will become a trulydemocratic political system, and moreover a democratizingMiddle Kingdom may well beoverwhelmed by the nationalisticsentiments that are part of China'scontemporary political culture. Evenif we arbitrarily and optimistically*assign a 50 percent probability toeach of these outcomes, over thenext decade *or so, that mean's thatthe chances of a Chinese regime thatis both democratic and cooperativewould be no more than 25 percent.Those are not the best of odds. Norare these odds of true democratizationwithin our ability to change.
　　Given this, it is far more importantto ask the fundamental question of howthe United States can manage China'srise through its own behavior. Which leads us to some of the policy implications that those others who *cling to thedemocratization-as-solution mantra might be better servedby drawing.
　　Rather than simply hoping for democratization,I would look toward creating greater economic*,意识形态优越感的威胁也将随之消除。因此，“从长期来看，美国能够学会与一个作为东亚头号强国的民主中国和平共处，就像英国逐渐接受美国在西半球的主导地位一样”。不过，“在这一天到来之前，华盛顿和北京仍将处在争夺亚洲控制权的日益激烈的斗争当中”。
　　之前就有人提出过这一观点。这是被吉姆·曼称为“欣慰局面”的乐观预测之一。而且这个观点充满变数。事实上，中国极不可能实行一个真正民主的政治体制。此外，一个民主化的中国或许会被民族主义情绪所淹没。民族主义是中国当代政治文化的一部分。即便我们主观且乐观地把这些结果在未来十年左右的时间里出现的可能性都定为50％，那么就意味着中国政权变得既民主又合作的可能性不会超过25％。这并不是最有可能出现的情况，在我们的改变能力之内实现(中国)真正的民主化也不是最有可能出现的情景。
　　有鉴于此，尤为重要的是提出这样一个根本问题：美国如何能够通过自身行为应对中国的崛起?对于那些坚持反复提及“靠民主制度解决问题”的人，我们在这里提出一点政策建议：抽签问卦对他们而言或许是一个更好的办法。
　　我认为，与其只是寄期望于民主化改革，倒不如在中国、美国和亚洲其他国家之间interdependence between China, the United States and therest of Asia. The Communist party is.dependent on economicgrowth for legitimacy--and that growth presently depends verymuch on exports, and exports depend very much on forEigninvestment. The policy of economic rebalancing that BEIjingis attempting may change those ratios somewhat, makingthe Chinese economy increasingly dependent on domesticconsumption and less reliant on exports, and exports morecontingent on Chinese firms and less on foreign investedones. But as the economy matures, there will also be increasinginterest in outbound Chinese foreign investment, and that willincrease Beijing's interdependence with the rest of the world--albeit in a different form. This creates an environment in whichAmerican can promote interdependence based on reciprocity.Actively welcome Chinese investment in the United States, aslong as comparable opportunities are available for American(and other foreign) firms in China. Chineseinvestment in an advanced economy likethat of the United States will mean. thatChinese goods sold stateside wil1 beincreasingly produced by American--notChinese--workers. Concomitantly, it willgive those Chinese firms with investmentsin the United States a *stake in stablerelations between Washington and Beijing.
　　Second, continue to welcomeChina's growing presence within existinginternational institutions--like the IMF,the World Bank and the United Nations--and its efforts tocreate new organizations to meet unfilled needs--like theSCO, the ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit--as long asthe United States is also given an appropriate role. There is ahuge difference between a rising power that wants more saywithin the existing international system and a rising power thatwants to promote fundamental changes to that system. It willbe key to ensure that those institutions--both old and new--are robust enough to simultaneously impose some constraintson Chinese behavior and reassure Beijing that its rise is beingaccommodated.
　　Above all, the United States needs to maintain a favorable*balance of power in the region. China may wish to dominate
its region the way that the United States historically dominatedthe Americas, or in the way that China itself dominated parts(but only parts) of Asia in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Butthose seventeenth- and nineteenth-century visions will be hardto achieve given twenty-first-century realities. Whatever造出更大的经济依附性。中共的合法地位取决于经济增长——经济增长目前在很大程度上取决于出口，而出口在很大程度上取决于外国投资。北京目前正在尝试的经济调整政策或许会些许改变那些比率，使中国经济日益依赖国内消费，减少对出口的依赖，并使出口更多地由中国企业而非外国投资企业完成。然而，随着经济的成熟，中国对外投资的兴趣也会越来越大，而这将加强北京与世界其他国家的相互依赖——尽管是以不同的形式。这就创造出这样一种环境：美国人可以利用互惠的方式增强双方的相互依赖性。(美国应当)积极地欢迎中国前来投资，只要美国(和其他外国)企业在中国可以获得同样的机会。中国在美国等发达经济体的投资将意味着，在美国境内销售的中国商品将越来越多地由美国工人生产，而不是中国工人。此外，对中国在美投资企业而言，华盛顿和北京之间的稳定关系将事关重大。
　　其次，(美国应当)继续欢迎中国在现有的国际机构内发挥更大的作用——比如国际货币基金组织、世界银行和联合国——以及中国为满足其未获满足的需要而创建新组织的做法——比如上海合作组织、东盟“10+3”和东亚峰会——只要也给予美国一个适当角色就可以。一个崛起中的大国希望在现有国际体系中拥有更多的发言权，与一个崛起中的大国希望对该体系进行根本性的改变，两者之间具有很大的差别。关键在于，要确保上述机构——不论新旧——足够稳固，以便在对中国的行为施加某些限制的同时，还能让北京相信，中国的崛起正被接纳。
　　最重要的是，美国需要在该地区保持于己有利的均势。中国或许希望主宰其所在的地区，就像历史上美国曾主宰美洲那样，或者效仿明清时代的中国主宰亚洲BEijing's ambitions may be, securing a dominant role incontemporary Asia will be extremely difficult. It is a verycrowded region, in which at least four other major powers(Russia, Japan, India and the U.S) are located or have majorinterests, and it is home to an increasingly strong regionalcommunity (ASEAN) and to several important middlepowers (notably Pakistan, Bangladesh, Australia and SouthKorea). Some scholars say that a dominant China--and asystem in which others in the region defer to BEIjing andChina exercises a limited form of hegemony -- is a "natural"outcome in the region. So far, however, few Asian powersseem to actually prefer such an outcome. (They probablydidn't prefer it in the past, either, but they had no choice.)There is a strong trend toward multipolarity in this diverseand vibrant area, and a unipolar. Asia would represent anenormous failure of power and will *on the part of theother regional actors.
　　The role of the United Stateswill be particularly important indetermining the area's future. Despitethe potential and clear preferencefor multipolarity, Japan is stagnant,Russia is focused more on Europe andits "near-abroad" in Eurasia, ASEANstill struggles to forge consensuses onforeign policy and India's future rateof economic growth remains uncertain.Washington will be key if the aim is avoid a bandwagoningscenario in which one frightened Asian country after anothersides with China. Revitalizing the American economy,refocusing more American military and diplomatic resourceson the Asia-Pacific region, and restoring the attractivenessof American economic and political models will be far moreeffective ways of promoting an open and stable Asia thansimply hoping China will democratize.
　　Yes, China is rising, and rising powers have posedchallenges in the past. But tO me, the most importantvariable in determining the outcome is not thedemocratization of China but the revitalization of the UnitedStates. 部分地区(但只是部分地区)。然而，鉴于21世纪的现状，要想重现17至19世纪时的盛况将是一件难事。不论北京有何雄心，在当代亚洲获取主导地位将是极其困难的。亚洲是个非常拥挤的地区，至少有另外四个主要大国(俄日印美)位于此地或在此有着重大利益。此外，此地还拥有一个日益强大的地区性组织(东盟)以及几个重要的中型国家(尤其是巴基斯坦、孟加拉国、澳大利亚和韩国)c一些学者说，—个占主导地位的中国——在这样一个体系中，该地区的其他国家服从于北京，中国享有一种有限形式的霸权——是该地区的“自然”结局。然而，迄今为止，好像没有几个亚洲国家真的想要这样的结局。(他们过去可能也不喜欢，但他们别无选择。)在这个多样化且生机勃勃的地区，多极化是一个强大的趋势，而一个单极化的亚洲表明影响力的全然失控，该地区其他的参与者难免其责。
　　在决定亚洲地区未来的问题上，美国的作用将极其重要。尽管对多极化的偏好是一个明显的潜在趋势，但日本目前停滞不前，俄罗斯更加关注欧洲和位于欧亚大陆的“近邻”，东盟仍然难以就外交政策达成一致，而印度未来的经济增长率仍是未知数。要想避免出现亚洲国家出于恐惧一个接一个地倒向中国一边的势头，华盛顿将是关键所在。在促进亚洲的开放与稳定这一问题上，重振美国经济、向亚太地区投入更多的美国军事和外交资源并恢复美国经济和政治模式的吸引力，将比只寄希望于中国的民主化改革要有效得多。
　　的确，中国正在崛起，而崛起中的大国在过去构成了挑战。但是在我看来，决定结局的最重要变量并非中国的民主化，而是美国的复兴。